To prevent and resolve the risk of "involution-style competition" during the 6·18 online promotion period, and to protect consumers' legitimate rights and maintain a fair and orderly online trading market, on June 11, 2026, the Beijing Municipal Market Supervision Bureau summoned five e-commerce platforms: Taobao (Tmall), JD.com, Pinduoduo, Douyin, and Xiaohongshu.
The Bureau reported the second batch of typical problems found in the comprehensive rectification of "involution-style competition" on platforms, mainly including false publicity of promotional activities, non-standard formulation and disclosure of promotion rules, and failure to disclose business operator information, and put forward rectification requirements.
1. Taobao (Tmall) Platform:
Since May 2026, the platform widely advertised the "6·18 Billion Subsidy" activity in media and apps.
However, when the regulator inquired, the Billion Subsidy was not a real investment of 10 billion by the platform to subsidize consumers during 6·18, but actually a long-term marketing activity.
The platform repeatedly refused to provide the actual subsidy amount invested during this 6·18 event and the contribution ratio between the platform and merchants.
The platform did not display the relevant rules for the "Billion Subsidy" activity in a prominent location, and some products in the "Billion Subsidy" channel did not disclose the qualification information of the actual seller.
2. Pinduoduo Platform:
The platform launched a "Billion Subsidy" activity, but did not specify the actual subsidy amount or the contribution ratio between platform and merchants in its rules, nor could it provide supporting materials.
In its promotion rules, a clause stated: "For any dispute related to goods, Pinduoduo as the platform may provide necessary assistance within the statutory scope, but does not assume responsibility related to the goods," which unilaterally exempted the platform's statutory liability.
3. JD Platform:
The platform launched "Billion Subsidy" and "Billion Agricultural Subsidy" activities, but did not disclose the promotion period, nor the actual subsidy amount or contribution ratio between platform and merchants in its rules, and could not provide supporting materials.
The "Billion Supermarket" did not disclose activity rules.
4. Douyin Platform:
The platform launched "6·18 Good Festival" and "Billion Consumption Voucher" activities, but did not disclose promotion rules to consumers.
In its activity merchant recruitment rules, it stipulated that if the platform adjusts the rules, it will directly notify merchants, without a public comment period.
5. Xiaohongshu Platform:
The "Points Lottery for Gifts" sales promotion activity had incomplete information disclosure, only labeling the total number of prizes, while core information such as winning probability and abandonment rules were not clearly disclosed.
In its activity rules, it stipulated that the platform can change and adjust the rules, and consumers' "continued participation shall be deemed as consent," excluding consumers' right to negotiation.
Liu Xiaochun, Director of the Internet Law Research Center at the University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, pointed out: Platforms competing to launch "billion subsidies" may trigger the risk of "involution-style competition," which is detrimental to healthy industry development.
In particular, irrational large-scale subsidies distort market price mechanisms.
Some platforms even stipulate that subsidies are fully borne by merchants, leaving merchants in a dilemma: without price cuts, they get no traffic, but with price cuts, they suffer losses.
Profit margins are severely squeezed, making it difficult for merchants to survive and hindering industry innovation and upgrading.
Multiple platforms have unilaterally exempted themselves from liability under non-force majeure circumstances in their rules, increasing risks for consumers.
Beijing Municipal Market Supervision Bureau emphasized:
First, platforms must deeply recognize the harm of "involution-style competition," shifting from focusing on subsidies and price wars to competing on innovation and service, promoting win-win development between platforms and their merchants and workers.
Second, platforms must immediately organize comprehensive self-inspections, systematically review and audit 6·18 promotion rules in accordance with relevant regulations, and swiftly rectify non-compliant issues.
Third, the Beijing Municipal Market Supervision Bureau will continue to use the comprehensive rectification mechanism for platform "involution-style competition," carrying out dynamic monitoring, responding promptly, and safeguarding normal market order.

